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Abstract
We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in markets where the agents have
k-demand valuations. These valuations are an extension of unit-demand valuations where a bundle’s
value is the maximum of its k-subsets’ values. For unit-demand agents, where the existence of a
Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed, we show that the problem is in quasi-NC. For k = 2, we show
that it is NP-hard to decide if a Walrasian equilibrium exists even if the valuations are submodular,
while for k = 3 the hardness carries over to budget-additive valuations. In addition, we give a
polynomial-time algorithm for markets with 2-demand single-minded valuations, or unit-demand
valuations.
1 Introduction
One of the most significant problems in market design is finding pricing schemes that guarantee good
social welfare under equilibrium. Evidently, the most compelling equilibrium notion in markets with
indivisible items is a Walrasian eqilibrium, henceforth WE, [35]: an allocation of items to the agents and
a pricing, such that every agent maximizes her utility and all items are allocated. By the First Welfare
Theorem, WE has the nice property of maximizing social welfare. The existence of WE seems to heavily
rely on the class of valuation functions of the agents. When parameterized by the valuation function
class, the existence of WE is (relatively) clear due to Gul and Stracchetti [21] and Milgrom [29]: WE are
guaranteed to exist only in the class of gross substitutes valuation functions. Two of the most central
and interesting problems regarding WE are:
(a) decide if a WE exists,
(b) compute a WE (if it exists).
We study the aforementioned two problems when valuation functions are parameterized by an integer
k which denotes the maximum bundle size k for which every agent is interested. Such a class of k-demand
valuation functions can be seen as an extension of the unit-demand functions, where each agent, for a
given bundle X values only the most valuable k-subset of X. The main idea behind k-demand valuations
is that every agent has some capacity for utilising the items that is either endogenously or exogenously
imposed. There are several real-life examples where more than k items have the same value as k of
them: a supervisor can effectively supervise up to a limited number of students; a grant investigator
can efficiently work up to a limited number of projects; a sports team is allowed to have up to a small
number of foreign players (or at least a small number of native players) in the squad; one can hang only a
certain number of paintings on their house’s walls. We investigate the complexity of the aforementioned
problems when we are restricted to the intersection of the standard valuation classes and the k-demand
classes. Our results contain hardness results as well as efficient algorithms.
As an example of the effect that k-demand valuation functions have on the complexity of these
problems, we present unbalanced markets. In such markets the available items are significantly more
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than the agents, or vice versa. We provide an algorithm for the aforementioned problems parameterized
by k. Complemented by a result of Rothkopf [31], this algorithm concludes that for constant k and
appropriate unbalancedness, these problems are in P.
1.1 Contribution
In this work we study WE under their classic definition with no relaxation or approximation notions
involved. We introduce a hierarchy of valuation functions, parallel to the already existing one. Our
valuation functions are called k-demand and are a generalization of unit-demand with parameter k that
determines at most how many items from a bundle the agent cares about. By definition, it is easy to see
that the class of j-demand is included in (j + 1)-demand for any j ∈ [m− 1]. The purpose of considering
valuation functions from the intersection of some k-demand class and some other known class, is to refine
the complexity of the WE-related problem.
Algorithms and hardness results on the existence of WE and/or the problem of computing one in the
current literature show an interesting dependence on the parameter k that we define here. For example,
existence of WE is guaranteed in the well studied case of unit-demand valuation functions (i.e. k = 1),
and a WE can be computed in polynomial time [16, 26]. Non-existence of WE is established in [32]
by proving that even WinnerDetermination is NP-hard and this is achieved for valuation functions
according to which the agents are only interested in at most 2 items (i.e. k = 2). Furthermore, non-
existence of WE and NP-hardness of WinnerDetermination is proven for single-minded agents via a
reduction to instances where agents are interested in at most 3 items (i.e. k = 3) [10]. For each of the
above cases of k we give improved results: we supplement the “easy” case, where k = 1, with a quasi-NC
algorithm1, and the “hard” cases with stronger NP-hardness results in the sense that ours imply the
existing ones.
Mixing the standard valuations’ hierarchy and the k-demand hierarchy results to a two-dimensional
landscape of valuation classes that aims to break down the complexity of the WE-related problems. For
example, a possible result could be that below some threshold of k and below some standard valuation
class, deciding WE existence is in P. Our results however indicate that this is not the case: even for k = 2
and submodular functions WinnerDetermination is NP-hard, and therefore deciding existence of WE
is also NP-hard. This is an improvement over the result of Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [32], where
NP-hardness is proven for k = 2 but general functions. Our reduction is entirely different than the one in
[32], and in particular, it is from the problem “3-bounded 3-dimensional matching” to a market with n
agents, m items and 2-demand submodular valuations. Furthermore, in [25] WinnerDetermination
is proven to be weakly NP-hard for budget-additive functions by reducing “knapsack” to a market with
2 agents, and m items. We show that the problem is strongly NP-hard for k-demand budget-additive
functions even for k = 3. The case k = 2 for the latter problem remains open.
On the positive side, we show a clear dichotomy for the problem of deciding WE existence with
single-minded agents. It was proven in [10] that WinnerDetermination is NP-hard, via a reduction
from “exact cover by 3-sets” to a market with single-minded agents who actually used 3-demand valu-
ations. We show that WinnerDetermination is solvable in polynomial time for single-minded agents
with 2-demand valuations by a reduction to the maximum weight matching problem. Then, by the
decomposition shown at the end of Section 2, one can find a WE pricing via an LP (if such a pricing
exists).
1.2 Related Work
Existense of Walrasian Equilibria. The most general class of valuation functions for which exis-
tence of WE is guaranteed has been proved by Gul and Stracchetti [21] and Milgrom [29] to be gross
substitutes. Other valuation classes (that can be seen as special market settings) outside gross substi-
tutes that guarantee WE existence have also been discovered, including the “tree valuations” in [7], and
the valuation classes of [4, 8, 9]. Interestingly, the former admits also a polynomial time algorithm.
Non-existence of WE has been shown for many valuation classes, mostly by constructing an ad
hoc market that does not identify some particular pattern as responsible for the non-existence (e.g.
[21, 25, 13]). Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen in [32] reprove some of these results and show a sys-
tematic way of proving non-existence of WE for more general valuation and pricing classes via standard
1This is the first parallel algorithm for computing WE to the authors’ knowledge.
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complexity assumptions. The latter paper shows the remarkable relation between computability of seem-
ingly arbitrary problems and existence of equilibria in markets. In fact, one of their results states that if
for some class V of valuation functions WinnerDetermination is computationally harder than finding
the demand for each agent, then there exist instances in V with no WE.
Computation of Walrasian Equilibria. On the computational side, in markets that do not guar-
antee existence of WE, the problem of deciding existence is NP-hard for all the most important valuation
classes. This has been established by proving that WinnerDetermination for budget-additive valua-
tions is NP-hard via the “knapsack” problem in [25] and via the strongly NP-hard problem “bin packing”
in [32]. By the fact that a WE corresponds to an optimal allocation, it is immediate that existence
of WE is at least as hard as WinnerDetermination. Since budget-additive functions are a subset
of submodular functions, it seems that as soon as valuation functions are allowed to be more general
than the class of gross substitutes, i.e. submodular, the problem is already NP-hard. Also, for the class
of single-minded agents (which is incomparable to the rest of the classes), WinnerDetermination is
NP-hard [10]. On the positive side, Rothkopf et al. [31] provide several classes of valuation functions
where WinnerDetermination can be efficiently solved. In particular, they show that when there
are logarithmically many items with respect to the number of agents, WinnerDetermination can be
efficiently solved via dynamic programming. Sandholm [33] provides a comparison of several different
methods for WinnerDetermination and experimentally evaluates them. It is also worth mentioning
the “tollbooth” problem on trees, defined in [22] (see also [11]), for which, even though WE existence is
not guaranteed, finding one (if it exists) is in P.
Relaxations/Approximations. Due to [21] and [29], existence of WE is guaranteed only in a restric-
tive class of functions, namely gross substitutes. This fact has ignited a line of works that, in essence,
question the initially defined WE as being the equilibrium that occurs in actual markets. These works
consider relaxed or approximate versions of WE. Some of the most interesting results on such relaxations
are the following:
 If only 2/3 of the agents are required to be utility maximizers then a relaxed Walrasian equilibrium
exists for single-minded agents ([10, 11]).
 If the seller is allowed to package the items into indivisible bundles prior to sale, not all items
have to be sold, and additionally only half of the optimal social welfare is required (Combinatorial
Walrasian equilibrium) then such an equilibrium exists for general valuation functions and can be
found in polynomial time ([18]).
 If agents exhibit endowment effect, meaning that the agents’ valuations for a bundle they already
possess is multiplied by a factor a, then for any a ≥ 2 there exists an a-endowed equilibrium for
the class of submodular functions ([2]). For stronger notions of endowment, endowed equilibria
exist even for XOS functions, and additionally, bundling guarantees equilibria for general functions
([17]).
Other works have also considered special classes of valuations that have as parameter the cardinality
of the valuable bundles ([13] and [12]). However these valuation functions are not identical to ours.
In [13] the valuation function of each agent, called k-wise dependent, is encoded in a hypergraph whose
vertices are the items and each hyperedge has a positive or negative weight that determines the additional
value of the bundle in case all of its adjacent vertices are a subset of the bundle. This class of valuations
is incomparable to ours by definition. The model of [12] is the same as that of [13], as argued in the
latter. Recently, Berger et al. in [5] introduced a hierarchy of valuation functions similar to ours, called
“k-demand” that also generalize unit-demand functions. The same definition of functions appears also
in [14]. However, those are a special case of our k-demand functions (i.e. also additive), and in fact they
are gross substitutes.
The paper is organized in sections so that each deals with a particular value or group of values for k.
We study unit-demand valuations in Section 3, 2-demand valuations in Section 4, 3-demand valuations
in Section 5, and k-demand valuations for constant k and unbalanced markets in Section 6. We conclude
with a discussion in Section 7.
3
2 Walrasian Equilibria and Valuation Functions
We consider markets with a set N of n agents and a set M of m items. Every agent i has a valuation
function vi : 2
M → R≥0; for every subset, or bundle, of items X ⊆ M agent i has value vi(X). A
valuation function vi is monotone if X ⊆ Y implies vi(X) ≤ vi(Y ), and it is normalized if vi(∅) = 0. In
what follows, we assume that all the agents have monotone and normalized valuation functions.
There are many different valuation functions studied over the years and we focus on several of them.2
 Unit-demand (UD): for agent i there exist m values vi1, . . . , vim and vi(X) = maxj∈X vij , for every
X ⊆M .
 Additive (AD): for agent i there exist m values vi1, . . . , vim and vi(X) =
∑
j∈X vij , for every
X ⊆M .
 Budget-additive (BA): for every agent i there exist m + 1 values vi1, . . . , vim, Bi, such that for







 Single-minded (SMi): for agent i there exist a set Xi ⊆M and a value Bi, such that vi(X) = Bi,
if Xi ⊆ X, and vi(X) = 0, otherwise.
 Submodular (SubM): for agent i and every two sets of items X and Y it holds vi(X) + vi(Y ) ≥
vi(X ∪ Y ) + vi(X ∩ Y ).
 Fractionally subadditive (XOS): for every agent there exist vectors vi1, . . . vik ∈ Rm and vi(X) =
maxj∈[k]
∑
l∈X vik(l), for every X ⊆M .
 Subadditive (SubA): for agent i and every two sets of items X and Y it holds vi(X) + vi(Y ) ≥
vi(X ∪ Y ).
We will focus on constrained versions of the aforementioned valuation functions, where the cardinality
of the sets an agent has value for is bounded by k. k-demand valuations naturally generalize unit-demand
valuations, but, at the same time, they keep the structure of more complex valuation functions.
Definition 1 (k-demand valuation). A valuation function v : 2m → R≥0 is k-demand if for every bundle





A very important remark is that when k is constant the problems have succinct representation, namely
polynomial in the number of agents and items, i.e. Θ
(
n ·mk · log V
)
, where V is the maximum valuation
among all bundles and among all agents. This makes our setting computationally interesting and also
removes the need for access to some value oracle or demand oracle: the former takes as input a bundle
and returns its value, and the latter, for some indicated agent, takes a pricing as input and outputs the








∈ Θ(mk) many j-subsets of M , j ≤ k, and an agent just needs to declare a value for
each; then the algorithm with this input can compute in polynomial time the value of the agent for any








bundles (these are the only ones that can maximize the utility of an agent; by
considering a bundle Y with more than k items, its value will correspond to a bundle X with k items,
but p(Y ) ≥ p(X)), and then (efficiently) search through them to find which ones yield the maximum
utility to the agent. In contrast, a great line of works has studied the complexity of the WE-related
problems, provided that value oracles and demand oracles are available (e.g. [6, 30, 21, 15, 27]).
An allocation S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) is a partition of M to n + 1 disjoint bundles, where agent i ∈ [n]
gets bundle Si. Items in S0 are not allocated to any agent. The social welfare of allocation S is
defined as SW (S) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Si). An allocation S is optimal if it maximizes the social welfare, i.e.,
2When we refer to a valuation function as general we mean that the value for any bundle does not depend on other
bundles’ values. It is clear that the set of general functions contains all other classes of functions.
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SW (S) ≥ SW (S′), for every possible allocation S′. A pricing p = (p1, . . . , pm) defines a price for every
item, where pj ≥ 0 is the price of item j. For X ⊆M , we denote p(X) =
∑
j∈X pj . Given an allocation
S and a pricing p, the utility of agent i is
ui(S, p) := vi(Si)− p(Si).
The demand correspondence of agent i with valuation vi under pricing p, denoted D(vi, p), is the set of
items that maximize the utility of the agent; formally D(vi, p) := {S ⊆M : ui(S, p) ≥ ui(T, p) for all T ⊆
M}. Any element of D(vi, p) is called demand set of agent i.
Definition 2 (Gross substitutes (GS)[24]). A valuation function satisfies the gross substitutes property
when for any price vectors p ∈ Rm and S ∈ D(v, p), if p′ is a price vector p ≤ p′ (meaning that for all
l ∈ S, pl ≤ p′l), then there is a set S′ ∈ D(v, p′) such that S ∩ {j; pj = p′j} ⊆ S′.
Intuitively, a valuation is gross substitute if after the increase of the prices of some items in some
demand set S of an agent, the agent still has a demand set S′ that contains the items with unchanged
prices.
It is known that UD ⊂ BA ⊂ SubM, that AD ⊂ GS ⊂ SubM, and finally that SubM ⊂ XOS ⊂
SubA. Furthermore, SMi valuation functions are not contained in any of these valuation classes.
Definition 3 (Walrasian Equilibrium). An allocation S = (S0, S1, . . . , Sn) and a pricing p = (p1, . . . , pm)
form a Walrasian equilibrium (WE), if the following two conditions hold.
1. For every agent i and any bundle X ⊆M it holds that vi(Si)− p(Si) ≥ vi(X)− p(X).
2. For every item j ∈ S0 it holds that pj = 0.
Walrasian
Input: A market with n agents and m items, and a valuation function for each agent.
Task: Decide whether the market possesses a Walrasian equilibrium, and if it does, compute one.
The First Welfare Theorem states that for any Walrasian equilibrium (S, p), partition S corresponds
to an optimal allocation [26]. Hence, walrasian can be decomposed into the following two problems.
WinnerDetermination
Input: A market with n agents and m items, and a valuation function for each agent.
Task: Find an optimal allocation S∗ for the items.
WalrasianPricing
Input: A market with n agents and m items, a valuation function for each agent, and an optimal
allocation S∗.
Task: Find a pricing vector p such that (S∗, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium, or decide that there
is no Walrasian equilibrium for the instance.
This decomposition highlights that a WE exists if and only if there exists a pricing vector p that
satisfies the conditions of Definition 3 for any optimal allocation S∗ = (S∗0 , S
∗
1 , . . . , S
∗
n).
For k-demand valuation functions, the conditions of Definiton 3 (and therefore a solution to








+ m equality/inequality constraints, where each constraint has at most 2k variables.
vi(S
∗
i )− p(S∗i ) ≥ vi(X)− p(X), ∀X ⊆M, where |X| ≤ k, ∀i ∈ N
pj ≥ 0, ∀j /∈ S∗0
pj = 0, ∀j ∈ S∗0 . (1)









































We conclude that, for constant k, a solution to linear system (1) (and thus, WalrasianPricing)
can be found in time polynomial in n and m by formulating it as an LP with objective function set to a
constant. So, the problem of deciding the existence of WE and the problem of computing one (if it exists)
essentially reduce to finding an optimal allocation S∗, i.e. WinnerDetermination. In Sections 4, 5, 6
we exploit the aforementioned fact and only investigate the complexity of WinnerDetermination.
3 Unit-demand Valuation Functions
The simplest case of markets is when the agents have unit-demand valuation functions. The existence of
WE in this class of markets was shown in the seminal paper of Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [16] via
an algorithm that resembles the tâtonnement process. This algorithm is pseudopolynomial in general,
and polynomial when the values of the agents are bounded by some polynomial. In [26] an algorithm
(Algorithm 1) is presented and it is shown that a modification of it finds a WE in time O(m2n+m4 log V ),
where V is the maximum valuation of any item across all agents.
In this section we show that walrasian in these markets is in quasi-NC. The complexity class quasi-NC
is defined as quasi-NC = dk≥0quasi-NCk, where quasi-NCk is the class of problems having uniform circuits
of quasi-polynomial size, nlog
O(1) n, and polylogarithmic depth O(logk n) [3]. Here “uniform” means that
the circuit can be generated in polylogarithmic space. Put differently, quasi-NC contains problems that
can be solved in polylogarithmic parallel time using quasi-polynomially many processors with shared
memory.
In this class of markets WinnerDetermination can be reduced to a maximum weight matching on
a complete bipartite graph. On the left side of the graph there exist n nodes corresponding to the agents,
on the right side there are m nodes corresponding to the items and the weight of the edge (i, j) equals
to the value of agent i for item j. The recent breakthrough of Fenner, Gurjar, and Thierauf [19] states
that the maximum weight perfect matching in bipartite graphs is in quasi-NC when the edge-weights are
bounded by some polynomial; later Svensson and Tarnawski [34] extended this result for general graphs.
Thus, if we augment the bipartite graph that corresponds to the market by adding dummy items with
zero value for every agent, or dummy agents with zero value for every item, we can guarantee that it
contains a perfect matching without changing any optimal allocation. Then, we can use the algorithm
of [19] and compute an optimal allocation in polylogarithmic time.
Given an optimal allocation, WalrasianPricing for these markets has a special structure. It is a
linear feasibility problem with polynomially many inequalities and at most two variables per inequality.
For this special type of feasibility systems there exists a quasi-NC algorithm [28].
Theorem 4. walrasian in unit-demand markets with polynomial valuations is in quasi-NC.
Proof. When shared memory is available, as in quasi-NC, we can solve WinnerDetermination in poly-
logarithmic parallel time via the algorithm of [19] and store it in the shared memory. Then, the processors
will read the solution, build the linear system for WalrasianPricing and solve it in polylogarithmic
time via the the algorithm of [28] on the shared memory. Hence, the composition of the two algorithms
can be done in polylogarithmic time using quasi-polynomially many processors.
Our result suggests a parallel algorithm that needs O(log3(n)) time which is significantly faster than
any serial algorithm. On the other hand though, it requires nlog(n) processors in the worst case. We
observe that this is the current best possible result, since any improvement would imply better parallel
algorithms for other important problems like maximum weight matching and feasibility of systems with
linear inequalities. We have to state though that it is open whether both aforementioned problems are in
NC. On the other hand, it is known that the maximum weight problem in graphs with polynomial weights
is in pseudo-deterministic RNC [1, 20]. Hence, a first improvement would be to place WalrasianPricing
in pseudo-deterministic RNC.
4 2-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we resolve the complexity of deciding existence of WE for 2-demand valuation functions.
As an example, consider the case where the football teams need to have at least 2 young native players
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in their squad. Each team knows exactly which pair of players wants and it does not want more young
players due to capacity constraints. A version of 2-demand valuations, termed pair-demand valuations,
was studied in [32], where every agent i has a value vi(j, k) for every pair of items and the value of
i for a bundle S is vi(S) = maxj,k∈S vi(j, k). These are general valuation functions that can allow
complementarities. We strengthen the results of [32] and prove that WinnerDetermination is NP-
hard even when the valuation functions of the agents are 2-demand submodular and every agent has
positive value for at most six items.
Theorem 5. WinnerDetermination is strongly NP-hard even for 2-demand submodular functions.
Proof. We reduce from 3-bounded 3-dimensional matching, termed 3dm(3). The input of a 3dm(3)
instance consists of three sets X,Y, Z, where |X| = |Y | = |Z|, and a set S of triplets (hyperedges)
(x, y, z) where x ∈ X, y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z. In addition, every element of X,Y, Z appears in at most three
triplets and every triplet shares at most one element with any other triplet. The task is to decide if there
is a subset of non-intersecting triplets of S of cardinality |X|. The problem is known to be NP-complete
[23].
For every element x ∈ X we create an agent and for every element in Y ∪ Z we create an item. Let
Sxj denote the set of items that correspond to the jth triplet of S that x belongs to. Recall that there
exist at most three such triplets. In addition, since any two triplets of S share at most one element, we
have that Sxj s are disjoint. Moreover, let Sx be the union of the elements from Sxj s. Then, the valuation
function of agent x for a subset of items T is defined as follows:
 vx(T ) = 2, if T contains some Sxj ;
 vx(T ) = 0, if |T ∩ Sx| = 0;
 vx(T ) = 1, if |T ∩ Sx| = 1;
 vx(T ) = 1.5, if |T ∩ Sx| ≥ 2 and T does not contain any Sxj .
Observe that if |T ∩Sx| > 3, then T will contain some Sxj , hence the definition of the valuation function
is complete. It is not hard to verify that vx is indeed a 2-demand submodular function.
We claim that there is an allocation with welfare 2|X| if and only if the 3dm(3) instance is satisfiable.
Firstly, assume that indeed the 3dm(3) instance has a solution S′, i.e., S′ contains |X| non intersecting
triplets in S. Then, if the triplet (x, y, z) belongs to S′ we allocate the items that correspond to y and z to
the agent that corresponds to x and the agent has value 2 for the bundle. Clearly, the allocation achieves
welfare 2|X|. For the other direction, assume that there is an allocation for the items with welfare 2|X|.
This means that every agent gets utility 2 from her allocated bundle. Then, by construction, each agent
x alongside her allocated bundle corresponds to a triplet from S. Observe, that the allocation consists
of non-overlapping bundles, hence we get |X| non intersecting triplets in S.
Theorem 5 implies that walrasian is NP-hard for any class of valuation functions that contains the
class of 2-demand submodular valuations.
Corollary 6. walrasian is strongly NP-hard even if all the agents have 2-demand submodular valuation
functions.
Closing the gap in single-minded valuations. In addition to the above hardness results we study
single-minded agents with 2-demand valuations and we show that in this case walrasian is easy, con-
trary to the case of 3-demand valuations where it is NP-hard [10]. To prove this, for agents that are
single-minded for bundles of size 2, we reduce WinnerDetermination to a maximum weight matching
problem over a graph G. Every item corresponds to a vertex of G. For every pair of items that is the
most preferable by an agent we create the corresponding edge with weight the value of the agent for the
items; if there are more than one agents that want the same pair of items we keep only the weight for
the highest valuation. Clearly, any maximum weight matching corresponds to an optimal allocation.
Next we show how to handle instances where every agent is either unit-demand or multi-minded over
a subset of size 2. Recall, a unit-demand agent-might have positive value for various items. An agent i
is multi-minded over a subset of size 2, if there exist items ai and bi and the agent has positive values
only for the following three bundles: {ai}, {bi}, and {ai, bi}. Observe the this is a strict generalisation
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of 2-demand single minded. To achieve this, we extend the construction described above as follows. For
every multi-minded agent i we add a new vertex xi and the edges (xi, ai), (xi, bi), with weights vi(ai)
and vi(bi) respectively. For every unit-demand agent i, we add a new vertex yi and the edges (yi, j),
where j is a vertex that corresponds to item j, with weight vi(j); i.e. equal to the agent’s value for item
j. Again, a maximum weight matching for the constructed graph corresponds to an optimal allocation.
Theorem 7. walrasian is in P for markets where every agent is unit-demand or multi-minded over a
subset of size 2.
5 3-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we prove strong NP-hardness for WinnerDetermination for 3-demand budget-additive
valuation functions. As an example for 3-demand budget additive valuation, we can think of departments
within a university that want to hire staff members for their labs. The agents are the departments, the
items are the staff members, and the available resources of each department’s lab defines the budget. The
value a department gets from a candidate equals the quantity of the resources the candidate is capable
of utilizing. The department is allowed to hire at most 3 staff members, due to regulations imposed by
the university.
Theorem 8. WinnerDetermination is strongly NP-hard even when all the agents have identical 3-
demand budget-additive valuation functions.
Proof. We prove the theorem with a reduction from 3-partition. An instance of 3-partition consists of a
multiset of 3n positive integers a1, a2, . . . , a3n summing up to S. The question is whether the multiset
can be partitioned into n triplets such that the elements of each triplet sum up to B = Sn . So, given an
instance of 3-partition we create a WinnerDetermination instance with n agents and 3n items. All
the agents have the same 3-demand budget-additive valuation: they have value ai for item i and budget
B.
The question we would like to decide is whether there exists an allocation with social welfare n ·
B. It is not hard to see that if there is a solution to 3-partition, then there exists an allocation for
WinnerDetermination with social welfare n ·B. On the other hand, observe that, due to the budget-
additive valuations, social welfare n · B for the instance can be achieved only when there exists an
allocation where every agent gets value B. In addition, since the agents have 3-demand valuation
functions it means that any allocation that maximizes the social welfare, without loss of generality,
allocates exactly three items to every agent; otherwise some agent gets more than 3 items and value gets
wasted since, by definition of 3-demand valuation, the agent will only appreciate the 3 most valuable
items. Hence, if there exists an allocation for the constructed instance with social welfare n·B, necessarily,
every agent gets exactly 3 items whose values sum up to B. This allocation trivially defines a solution
to 3-partition.
Corollary 9. walrasian is strongly NP-hard even if all the agents have identical 3-demand budget-
additive valuation functions.
6 Constant-demand Valuation Functions
In this section we study markets where the agents have k-demand valuation functions, where k is constant.
Our results from the previous sections imply that deciding the existence of a WE is NP-hard even when
k = 2 and the valuation functions are submodular. In addition, we showed that the problem is NP-hard
for k = 3 even for budget-additive valuations [13]. This means that in order to get efficient algorithms
we have to further restrict our market design in markets that retain constant demand k, but with either
reduced number of agents, or reduced number of items. For this reason, we study unbalanced markets.
A market is unbalanced if the number of available items is significantly larger than the number of agents,
formally, m ∈ ω(n), or the other way around, n ∈ ω(m). For the case where, m = O(log n) and any k
the dynamic programming approach of Rothkopf [31] solves WinnerDetermination in O(n3). Next
we show a result for the case where the market is unbalanced in the opposite direction.
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Theorem 10. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items, where k and n are constant,
WinnerDetermination is in P.
Proof. We consider the unbalanced market where the number of available items m is a lot greater than the
number of items k ·n to be allocated. The number k ·n comes from the fact that in an optimum allocation,
not more than k · n items will be appreciated by the agents (by definition of the k-demand valuation
function). Therefore, allocating more than these items does not improve the social welfare, thus, does not
yield additional WE. In this case, we can find all possible subsets of size k·n of items, that is, all candidate
sets of items to be allocated to the agents. Formally, we consider the set I := {L ⊆ M | |L| = k · n}





∈ O((m− k · n)k·n), which is a polynomial in m
when k and n are constant.
Observe now that, given a subset L of items with size k · n, one can construct a k + 1-uniform
hypergraph, i.e. a hypergraph all of whose hyperedges have size k + 1, in the following way. Have
its vertex set be L ∪ N , and for every k-subset Lk of L have a hyperedge Lk ∪ {i} for every i ∈ N .
Also, assign to each hyperedge a weight equal to the valuation of agent i for the item bundle Lk, namely
vi(Lk). On this graph one can run a brute-force algorithm to find a maximum weight (k+1)-dimensional
matching in constant time, since the graph is of constant size. Then, by repeating the same routine for
all (k ·n)-subsets of I in time polynomial in m, we pick the one that yields the maximum sum of weights
in the matching. The optimal allocation of items to agents corresponds to the aforementioned optimum
matching. The running time of this algorithm is O(mc) for some constant c, i.e. polynomial in the input









bits, where V := max i∈N
X⊆M
vi(X); that is because every
agent has to declare how much her valuation is for every k-subset of items.
Corollary 11. In markets with k-demand valuations, n agents and m items, where k and n are constant,
walrasian is in P.
7 Discussion
In this paper we study the complexity of computing Walrasian equilibria in markets with k-demand
valuations. As we show, even for the smallest possible value for k, the problem of deciding WE existence
remains NP-hard for the next greater well-studied class of valuations outside gross substitutes (submod-
ular). Hence, we turn to the study of unbalanced markets and present a polynomial-time algorithm for
k-demand general valuations, where k is constant.
For markets with k = 1, known as “matching markets”, we prove that the problem is in quasi-NC.
We view this as a very interesting result since all the known algorithms for the problem are highly
sequential. Can we design an NC algorithm for the problem via a form of a simultaneous auction? This
would be remarkable since it would imply that bipartite weighted matching is in NC. For k = 2 we
show that WinnerDetermination is intractable even for submodular functions, and for k = 3 the
hardness remains for an even stricter class, namely budget-additive functions. In order to completely
resolve the complexity of 2-demand valuations, it remains to solve WinnerDetermination for 2-
demand budget-additive valuations. Is the problem NP-hard, or is there a polynomial time algorithm
for it? Answering this question would provide a complete dichotomy for the complexity of the problems
WinnerDetermination and also Walrasian. For unbalanced markets with constant k, we covered
the cases m ∈ O(log n) and n ∈ Θ(1). Are there efficient algorithms for any n ∈ ω(m) and m ∈ ω(n)?
Another very intriguing direction is to study approximate Walrasian equilibria. The recent results of
Babaioff, Dobzinski, and Oren [2] and of Ezra, Feldman, and Friedler [17] propose some excellent notions
of approximation. Can we get better results if we assume k-demand valuations?
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[31] Michael H Rothkopf, Aleksandar Pekeč, and Ronald M Harstad. Computationally manageable
combinational auctions. Management science, 44(8):1131–1147, 1998.
[32] Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Why prices need algorithms. In Proceedings of the
sixteenth acm conference on economics and computation, pages 19–36, 2015.
[33] Tuomas Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial
Intelligence, 135(1):1 – 54, 2002.
[34] Ola Svensson and Jakub Tarnawski. The matching problem in general graphs is in quasi-nc. In
Proc. of FOCS, pages 696–707, 2017.
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